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State Prison,
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Respondent.

STATHM! •
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This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Rule-, of \ppellate Procedure Rule 41
upon the certification of a question of law from the federal court.
K\ A I'l'.MKN I'm- l IRTIHIhOUFSI ION
II Mi flimlner had presented the ineffective assistance of counsel claim at issue in
Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 I T 12, 94 P.3d 263, in State court in a successive petition in
1990, would the petition lia.c ucen , ;.>mlui,illy vlilaulU'il''
RKI.FV<\NT ('<)NS'111 U I'lONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 65B(i)(4) Tin effect •
the denial of any comp i a.., .>

• .; ,. .:

L.,:

1

"'

, <.. <

, amii. *>f

proceeding brought under this rule and may not be raised in another subsequent proceeding
except for good cause shown."
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution: "In all criminal proceedings, the
accused shall enjoy the right... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution: " . . . [N]or shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1) [in effect in 1985] "Criminal homicide constitutes
murder in the first degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of
another under any of the following circumstances: . . .."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2): "Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his
conduct or to the circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge,
with respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably
certain to cause the result."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Gardner was tried and convicted of the capital murder of Michael Burdell in
1985. His conviction and sentence were subsequently affirmed by this Court in State v.
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990). Mr. Gardner
then filed a post-conviction petition which was granted in part in 1991. This Court reversed
the partial grant of the petition in Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 680 (Utah 1994), cert
denied, 516 U.S. 828 (1995), affirming the conviction and sentence in the underlying case.
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Thereafter, Mr. Gardner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court which is
currently pending and has resulted in the issuance of this certification ol a question oi law,
STATEMENT M' I'M IN KhU«,\\\N I " «M ISSI i|'S < >l< IM« H 'H)l 'R A! Di^i\/ \l)L/X
Trial Facts Surrounding the Erroneous Instruction
At trial, there wa^ little dispute about the fact* sunounding the shooting of MiH
Burdell. During the trial, Mr. * «ti, uiiu 's counsel conce
respor

?

t

csucd that die shooting was at most a

second deeree depraved indifference murder or a lesser manslaughter charge based on
recklessness.
A .Jt. w( i. iuti

"knowing

.

>ei definition of

(Exhibit b lo Reap^iJent's Motion foi Nummary

JudgmenL) The nia; couri rejected ihi-< Instruction and instead improperly instructed the
jury in language that did not require Ihejmy lo luiil lluil ! Ji

,l

i,,tnl!]iT\ ".-mint,! uiri

"reasonably CITI.HII »< <"Misr thr ivsulf and thus permitted conviction simply if the jury
found that Mr. Gardner was aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances.
IiislifiHinii! i\|ii "in ir;i(k nil ilk rntMch as follows:

• •

A person engages in condu. ' : '• 'Tnteniinnallv" when it is his
conscious objective or desire to en^nv *r 'tie conduct or to
cause the result; or (2) "Knowingly'" w nen he is aware of the
nature of his conduct, or the existing circumstances, or is
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. •
(Exhibit 7 (o Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment [emphasis added].)

In closing argument, the prosecutor noted the second required element of first
degree murder is "that Ronnie Lee Gardner caused said death either intentionally or
knowingly." (T. 1303.) He then acknowledged that this was the key issue in the trial.
"From the comments made during opening statements, it is apparent that this is the element,
that this is the issue that the defendant contests." (Ibid.) The prosecutor then read the
incorrect instruction verbatim to the jury. (T. 1303-1304.) He informed the jury "that the
element of intentionally or knowingly is, again, in the alternative. The state doesn't have to
prove both, that he intentionally and knowingly caused the death, only one of them, either
intentionally or knowingly. I think this is quite important. As you read the instructions, you
see that both are concerned with the conduct or results. Don't have to even intend the
results as long as you intend to engage in the conduct that produces the results, and that's
the key, the conduct." (Ibid.)
The jury convicted Mr. Gardner of first degree murder; however, the verdict form
does not reflect whether the mental state element was based on an intentional or knowing
killing. (Exhibit 7 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 598.)
2.

Mr. Gardner's Direct Appeal

Mr. Gardner was represented on direct appeal by attorneys from the Salt Lake Legal
Defender's Association, the same office that handled the trial. The issue concerning the
erroneous jury instruction on the mental state requirement for first degree murder was not
raised on appeal. Both of Mr. Gardner's appellate counsel have stated they did not
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purposely exclude this issue from the direct appeal. (Exhibit E to Petition, R. 97; Exhibit
F to Petition, R. 141.)
3.

The Initial Post-Conviction Petition

Mr. Gardner was represented by pro bono attorneys Craig Truman, Manny Garcia,
and Karen Chaney in the filing of his first post-conviction petition. These attorneys did not
raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to challenge the erroneous
instruction on direct appeal. Each of the attorneys filed an affidavit stating they did not
"purposely or with an intent to delay" fail to raise this instructional issue in that petition.
(R. 275-276, 347-350.)
4.

The District Court Decision Finding Good Cause
for the Second Post-Conviction Petition

During the initial proceedings in district court on the second post-conviction
petition, that court ruled that it should apply the factors set out in Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d
1029 (Utah 1989), to determine whether the court should proceed to the merits of the
claim. In analyzing the factors in this case, the court found that Mr. Gardner had met his
burden under two Hurst factors: fundamental fairness and no intent to delay. (R. 363-64.)
In applying these factors in the context of a capital case, the trial court also expressed
concern about the "gravity of the death penalty" and "the possibility that this conviction
could be reversed" if the claim is meritorious. (R. 364.)

5

5.

This Court's Decision on Appeal

This Court did not reach the issue of whether Mr. Gardner's petition would have
been procedurally defaulted under the law in effect in 1990. Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT
42,112.
HURST V. COOK CONTROLLED THE DETERMINATION
OF PROCEDURAL DEFAULT IN 1990
In 1989, this Court for the first time set out the rules regarding "what constitutes
'good cause shown.'" Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037.
The prior adjudication of a habeas petition does not bar the
adjudication of a subsequent petition as a matter of res
judicata, but Rule 65B(i)(4) does require a showing of good
cause for filing of a successive writ. If good cause is not
shown, the petition should be dismissed for "prior
adjudication." Rule 65B(i)(4) does not state what constitutes
"good cause shown," and this Court has not previously
addressed the meaning of "good cause " in this context "
Id. at 1036-1037 [emphasis added].1
This Court then established at least five factors which may demonstrate good cause.
A showing of good cause that justifies the filing of a
successive claim may be established by showing (1) the denial
of a constitutional right pursuant to new law that is, or might
be, retroactive, Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81, (2) new facts

*In Andrews v. Shulsen, 113 P.2d 832 (Utah 1988), this Court held that a successive
petition was barred because "'good cause' has not been shown by plaintiff." The Court did
not provide a detailed explanation supporting its conclusions, and the Court did not set out
the factors for the determination of "good cause" until Hurst was decided a year later.
Moreover, Justice Durham, possibly anticipating the Hurst result, dissented finding that
"[t]here is no suggestion in this case of deliberate withholding of claims. . . ." Id. at p. 834
(Durham, J., dissenting.)
6

not previously known which would show the denial of a
constitutional right or might change the outcome of the trial,
Lafferty, 116 P.2d 631, 109 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, (3) the
existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction, (4) the
illegality of a sentence, Rammell, 560 P.2d 1108, or (5) a
claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse
the writ. See Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 877, 70 L. Ed. 2d 187, 102 S. Ct. 357
(1981). See generally Note, The Rush to Execution:
Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions in Capital Cases, 95
Yale L.J. 371,382-88(1985).
Id. at 1037 (footnote omitted).
Respondent has not argued that Hurst can be overlooked by this Court. Indeed, in
the prior briefing before this Court, he urged this Court to overrule at least part of Hurst.
See, Respondent's Brief filed in Case No. 20010875, pp. 33-35.
On the record before it, the district court analyzed the petition under the guidance of
the Hurst factors and held that two factors did exist: the petition raised an issue of
fundamental fairness and there was no intent to delay or abuse the writ. The district court
was also concerned about the gravity of the death penalty, a concern which echoes that of
Hurst where this Court noted that "habeas corpus is the precious safeguard of our personal
liberty. . . assuring that one is not deprived of life or liberty in derogation of a
constitutional right

" Hurst, 111 P.2d at. 1034.

As to the first factor, the district court held that "claims that potentially lead to the
conclusion of fundamental error or that the petitioner's due process rights were denied
must be reexamined to 'assure that substantial justice was done' regardless of whether the
merits of the claim could have been asserted in a prior petition." (R. 363, emphasis added,
7

citation omitted.) The district court held "[specifically, because of the critical nature of
jury instructions concerning the requisite elements of the crime charged, the petitioner's
claim of an instructional error is precisely the type of 'fundamental unfairness' that
potentially invokes the due process clause and, at the very least, 'raises a fair question as to
whether a new trial should be granted.'" (R. 363, emphasis added, citation and footnote
omitted.)
In determining this factor under Hurst, the district court properly examined the type
of claim raised in the petition in deciding whether it raised an issue of fundamental
fairness. Having determined that the claim addressed such an issue, the district court
properly held that the petition was not procedurally defaulted and the merits of the claim
should be addressed.
Respondent in the district court conceded that
meritoriousness plays no part in determining whether to reach
a successive claim's merits. Even Hurst,. . . does not require
considering petitioner's claim's meritoriousness in order to
determine whether to reach the merits. To the contrary, the
supreme court did not reach the merits of Hurst's claim until it
first found he had established good cause for not raising the
claim in his first petition.
(R. 287.)
There can be no question that an erroneous instruction on the only contested
element at trial in a capital murder case falls within the fundamental fairness factor of

8

Hurst.2 As such, the district court's analysis and conclusion were correct, and this Court
should adopt that court's reasoning and find that there was good cause under this factor.3
The other Hurst factor applicable in this case is that the "claim was overlooked in
good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ." In Hurst, this Court concluded that
"Hurst's raising of the issue now indicates no intent to delay or abuse the writ." Hurst, 111
P.2d at 1038. Hurst cites Potts v. Zant, supra, as support for this factor. Potts stressed
that there was no abuse of the writ unless there was an intentional abandonment of a known
right or privilege. Potts, 638 F.2d at 736. In essence, to find an abuse of the writ a court
would have to find that there was a deliberate bypass made in an attempt to obtain two
separate hearings for the petitioner.4

2

"The general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an
offense is essential. Failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error." State v. Roberts,
711 P.2d235, 239 (Utah 1985).
3

A district court can upon review of a post-conviction petition determine that the
claim raised is "frivolous" and summarily dismiss the petition on the merits. Rule 65B(c).
However, the district court did not summarily dismiss on this ground, and Respondent did
not move for summary judgment on this ground at the procedural default stage. Therefore,
it would be inappropriate for this Court to examine the merits of the petition in answering
the certified question before it at this time.
4

While the intentional relinquishment of a known right and deliberate bypass
concepts may no longer be applicable in federal court, this Court was entirely within its
powers to adopt this rule in determination of its own state law. In 1990, this Court refused
to adopt the federal "cause and prejudice standard." See, Dunn v. Cook, 491 P.2d 873, 878
(Utah 1990). Respondent has elsewhere argued that this Court should overrule this Hurst
factor; however, such action does nothing to answer the certified question before this Court
at this time. It would be inappropriate for this Court to use this proceeding to overrule
Hurst.
9

Similarly, in the instant case, the district court held that "Ms. Chaney's Affidavit
adequately supports the petitioner's contention that the claim was not purposely omitted
from the first petition." (R. 364.)5 There can be no finding that there was an intentional
relinquishment of this claim. Respondent did not challenge the veracity of the affidavits in
the district court, and this Court has no basis to disregard them; moreover, the record
contains no evidence of any intention to abuse the writ in this matter.
The claim was originally overlooked in good faith, as the prior attorneys stated and
the district court found. There is no reason for this Court to overturn the factual findings
upon which the district court reached its conclusion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court must answer the certified question under the
dictates of Hurst and thus conclude, as the district court did, that the second petition filed
by Mr. Gardner would not have been procedurally defaulted had it been filed in 1990 under
the then existing law related to successive post-conviction petitions.
DATED: April 21, 2006

riff?
v_^x^ndrew Parnes
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
Ronnie Lee Gardner

5

Mr. Gardner supplied the affidavits of the two other attorneys who represented him
in the first post-conviction petition as well.
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